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   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                               ) No. CR08-224
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              Plaintiff,
                                  GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
                                  AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
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                                  APPLICATION TO CRIMINAL DUTY JUDGE
                V.
                                  FOR REVIEW OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S
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   JAMES FAYED, et al.,
                                  BAIL ORDER
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                   Defendant.
                                 Court: TBD
                                 Date: TBD
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                                  Time: TBD
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        Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its
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   counsel of record, the United States Attorney's Office for the
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   Central District of California, hereby applied to the Criminal
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   District Duty Judge for review of the August 4, 2008, order of
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   bail release upon conditions issued by the Hon. Ralph Zarefsky,
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   which the court stayed until August 6, 2008 at 4:00 p.m., at the
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   request of the government.
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The government continues to seek detention. In support of its continued request for detention, the government proffers (1) the contents of the Pre-Trial Services Report(s); (2) the indictment filed February 26, 2008 and unsealed on August 1, 2008; (3) the facts introduced during the August 4, 2008 detention hearing, some of which are recounted here; (4) additional facts set forth herein that would be affirmed by the case agent if called to testify about those facts; and (5) such further argument or evidence as may be requested by the Court at the hearing on this matter.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Summary of the Evidence in Support of the Pending Charge

Defendant was arrested on August 1, 2008 on an indictment charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960, operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. The indictment also charged "Goldfinger Coin & Bullion, Inc. ("GCB")." Defendant admitted to Pretrial Services that he owned and operated GCB. Evidence introduced during the initial detention hearing, and which will be introduced during this hearing, shows that GCB operated in Camarillo under defendant's control and used computers to transfer funds on behalf of account holders who opened accounts online over defendant's website, "e-Bullion.com." The Pretrial Services report and additional evidence to be introduced at this hearing shows that during a roughly eight-month period in 2005 and 2006, bank accounts in the name of GCB, over which defendant

was a signatory (along with his deceased, estranged wife), received and transferred out over \$20,000,000 in proceeds from Ponzi scheme victims. The victims did not intend to use defendant's business to purchase gold or precious metals, as defendant's website represents as the service offered by defendant's company. Neither defendant nor the entities he admittedly controls were licensed to transfer such funds. Accordingly, defendant was charged with operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. The indictment was returned on February 26, 2008, under seal, to permit the government to continue its investigation.

B. Defendant and Pamela Fayed Retained Criminal Defense Counsel

In connection with the government's criminal investigation, defendant retained defense counsel. Pamela Fayed, his former wife and a signatory on GCB accounts and an officer of GCB at one time, retained her own defense counsel. It should be noted that such counsel were separate and apart from the parties' divorce counsel, as discussed below.

- C. The Murder of Pamela Fayed and Defendant's Role as the Primary Suspect
 - 1. The Acrimonious Marital Dissolution

In October 2007, defendant filed to divorce his wife,

Pamela. The parties retained separate counsel with orders

entered requiring that James pay the cost of Pamela's counsel as

well as temporary support of about \$10,000 per month. In or

about April 2008, a hearing before a retained judge was held at

which time a receiver was appointed to examine and secure gold and holdings at the business location controlled by defendant. At that time, defendant had been in substantial arrears in paying Pamela's counsel as well as back support. Thus, about that time, defendant paid approximately \$185,000 to her counsel, to her, and to experts hired in connection with the dissolution matter. More important, a hearing was scheduled for July 29, 2008, at 11:00 a.m., for the judge to rule on Pamela's request for support of \$55,000 per month, for support arrearages, and for sanctions of about \$400,000. Defendant was facing the likelihood of paying approximately \$1,000,000 on July 29. As will be apparent below, the date of July 29, 2008 is crucial to the government's argument that defendant is a flight risk and a danger.

2. <u>Subpoena for GCB's Business Records</u>

In or about April 2008, defendant provided business records to Pamela's forensic accountants, only after he was ordered to do so after resisting for months, in order to allow the accountants to ascertain the value of the marital estate and to provide information to set spousal support. At that time, the government's investigation into defendant's business affairs remained underway and the government subpoenaed the accountants to produce the records they had obtained from defendant. The accountants obtained separate counsel. The accountants were advised by Pamela's criminal defense counsel that the documents sought might be privileged. Thus, the government provided extensions of time for production of the documents to allow

counsel to sort out possible privilege issues. The government gave the accountant's counsel until August 1, 2008 by which to either provide the documents or to provide a log describing any privileges.

3. <u>Pamela Wanted to Cooperate</u>

On or about June 24, 2008, Pamela's then defense counsel advised the government that Pamela wanted to cooperate in its investigation.

4. The July 28, 2008 Meeting is Scheduled

During the week of July 21, 2008, more specifically, either on July 23, 24, or 25, Pamela's criminal defense counsel received a call from defendant's criminal defense counsel. The call was placed to schedule a meeting for the parties' criminal defense counsel at defendant's counsel's office in Century City for July 28, 2008 at 3:30 p.m. Defendant's divorce hearing had already been set for July 29, 2008 (the next day), at which time defendant faced the prospect of having to pay nearly a million dollars. Yet, Pamela's divorce lawyer was not asked to attend, did not know about the meeting as scheduled, and did not attend the meeting, nor did defendant's divorce lawyer.

5. The July 28, 2008 Century City Meeting Between Criminal Defense Counsel, Not Divorce Counsel, and Pamela's Murder

Pamela arrived at the Century City meeting just prior to 3:30 p.m. She had driven from Camarillo. Defendant had lived in Moorpark at the time of the meeting. Pamela parked on the third

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floor of a parking structure adjacent to the defense counsel's office building. The meeting lasted about three hours. Pamela left the meeting about 6:30 p.m. Defendant remained in the building with his lawyer. Pamela arrived at her car and was accosted by a tall male who stabbed her in the chest, neck, and face. She died of her wounds. There was no evidence of a robbery or carjacking.

6. <u>Further Evidence Connecting Defendant to Pamela's</u> Murder

Pamela's murderer left the crime scene in a red SUV that was captured on surveillance video, along with its license. The license was traced to Avis car rentals in Camarillo, not far from defendant's business. The vehicle had been rented from Avis on July 3, 2008 using an American Express card issued to defendant and GCB. An American Express credit card with the same account number was found in defendant's wallet during a search of his residence in the days following Pamela's murder.

During the search of defendant's residence, officers also found approximately \$60,000 in cash wrapped in plastic material; approximately \$3,000,000 in gold; and approximately 31 firearms, including one with a long-range night vision scope, along with thousands of rounds of matching ammunition. The cash and gold were seized. The firearms were left as lawfully in defendant's possession.

Defendant's residence is located near the end of a dirt road near the center of a several hundred-acre parcel in a remote part

of the mountains between Moorpark and Simi Valley.

During a meeting between defendant and Pamela in the weeks before her murder, when tensions regarding the production of incriminating accounting documents and the looming divorce hearing were especially high, defendant told Pamela (as related to officers by Pamela's friend) that "I could have you killed and my hands would be clean." He patted his hands in a motion as if to show they were clean.

During a search of defendant's business on August 4, 2008, agents found several million dollars in gold and coins.

D. The August 4, 2008 Detention Hearing

At the detention hearing on July 28, 2008, Magistrate Judge Zarefsky ordered defendant released on bond with conditions including the posting of \$500,000, secured by real estate. The court relied on the Pretrial report indicating that defendant had approximately \$2.2MM in real estate equity and over \$7,000,000 in assets. Judge Zarefsky concluded that the evidence of defendant's "obstruction" was "thin," referring to the judge's conclusion that there was a "thin" link between the murder investigation and the facts that supported the present charge.

II.

THIS COURT CAN AND SHOULD ORDER DEFENDANT DETAINED BECAUSE

HE IS A FLIGHT RISK AND A DANGER

Section 3142(g) sets forth the factors the Court should consider in determining whether detention is appropriate:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime

of violence, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device;

- (2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
- (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including--
 - (A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and
 - (B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and
- (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); see also <u>United States v. Winsor</u>, 785 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1986). When applied to defendant, these factors weigh conclusively in favor of detention.

The government argued and continues to argue that defendant's role as the primary suspect in Pamela's murder makes him a serious risk of flight and a danger to others, whether or not Pamela was murdered in order to obstruct the present case. The facts show that defendant had become desperate. He was facing a serious family law hearing at which time he would likely be required to pay Pamela a substantial amount of money. He had resisted doing so for months. He was likely concerned that Pamela would cooperate and be a witness against him in this case.

His business records that he had resisted turning over to her were about to be turned over to the government. Pamela traveled to the Century City meeting alone and for the purpose of attending that meeting, which had been set up only days before defendant would atone to the family law judge. There was no other reason for Pamela to be in the parking structure and it is reasonable to assume that only a few people knew exactly what structure she would be parking in, and where in that structure she would park her car among the hundreds, if not thousands, of parking spaces: defendant is at the top of that list. Moreover, few people would have known how long the meeting lasted and how convenient it was that defendant remained in the building at the time of Pamela's murder.

Based upon these facts, and such additional facts as may be introduced at the hearing, this Court can and should conclude that defendant, at this time, has every reason to flee, and that no condition or combination of conditions can assure his appearance in this case. It is respectfully submitted that Judge Zarefsky erred in determining that there was no nexus between the murder case facts and the present case facts, which he concluded was required in order to find that defendant was a flight risk for this case. The law does not require that determination and, indeed, it would be absurd if that were the case. No connection between the case facts for the murder and the case facts for this case need be found. It is simply a question of whether or not defendant is a flight risk for any reason. Thus, for example,

under Judge Zarefsky's reasoning, an arrest warrant in another jurisdiction could not be used to support a flight risk conclusion in this case if that warrant were based on wholly different facts. In short, the motivation and opportunity to flee, and to thus become unavailable for any further proceedings, is the basis for detention; not defendant's reason or basis to flee.

Additionally, defendant is clearly a danger to others. The evidence reasonably supports an inference, for the purposes of this hearing, that he hired one or more individuals to murder Pamela and that defendant believed he would have an alibi. That defendant did not commit the murder is irrelevant. Indeed, under these facts one would not expect him to do so. Instead, as the evidence shows, defendant had the motive, the opportunity, and the desire to eliminate the obligation and threat that Pamela posed.

Furthermore, defendant's relatively limited prison exposure to the present count (five-year statutory maximum term) does not address the flight risk and danger questions. Defendant faces forfeiture (although not alleged, it will be pursued) of his business and property. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) ("The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section . . . 1960 of this title, shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.") Defendant's desperation and risk of flight

cannot be underscored when considered not only in light of his connection to Pamela's murder, but to the prospect that he faces losing what he appears to cherish more, his money, pursuant to the sanctions that might be imposed in the present case.

III.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the government asks that the Court order that defendant be detained pending trial.

DATED: July 29, 2008

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United States Attorney

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/s/

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Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA